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CHAPTER 18 
State and Municipal Government 
FRANCIS J. QUIRICO and WILLI_~~ J. CURRAN 
In the 1954 SURVEY there were separate chapters on the subjects of 
state government and municipal government. Because there were less 
significant developments in the state government field this year, and 
because of the difficulty of separate treatment in any case, the chapters 
are combined in this year's SURVEY. 
Though they are not what may be called actual "developments" in 
the field, and consequently are not treated at length in this volume, 
attention is called to two important intergovernmental studies, one 
completed and the other initiated during the 1955 SURVEY year. The 
completed study is on the federal level, the final report of the Commis-
sion on Intergovernmental Relations.1 It represents, according to the 
Commission, the first official body since the founding of the republic 
formally to make a study of the functional relationships between the 
local, state, and federal governments. The second study, on the state 
level, is the establishment of the Special Commission on State and Lo-
cal Relatioiis2 which is to report to the legislature in 1956. The Com-
mission is authorized to study and make recommendations in the fields 
indicated in its title. In the main, it is expected to consider problems 
of "home rule" for local government which have received a great deal 
of attention in recent years in this state. It will be recalled that some 
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attempts at change in this area were defeated by the 1954 legisla-
ture.S We will await with interest the report of the new study group. 
A. STATE GOVERNMENT 
§18.1. The four-year term. A proposed amendment to the state 
Constitution to provide four-year terms for the Governor, Lieuten-
ant Governor, State Secretary, Treasurer and Receiver General, At-
torney General, and Auditor was adopted by the General Court in 
1954.1 In order to be placed on the popular ballot for ratification, the 
amendment must be adopted again by the General Court during the 
1956 session. On May 16, 1955, the amendment was approved by the 
legislature in Constitutional Convention. However, the Democratic 
floor leader of the House, Representative Thompson of Ludlow, moved 
reconsideration of the vote, and the Convention adjourned without 
taking action on his motion. If the action of approval stands, the 
amendment will go on the 1956 ballot; if not, the 1956 session of the 
General Court must approve it and it cannot go on the ballot until 
1957. It is reported that an advisory opinion will be asked of the Su-
preme Judicial Court to settle the question. Of course, behind all of 
the parliamentary maneuvering is the fact that the Democratic Party fa-
vors placing the state election of four-year-term officers in the presiden-
tial election year while the Republican Party favors the state officer 
elections in the mid-term of presidential elections. 
§18.2. State government structural changes. Since the state's "Baby 
Hoover Commission" has finished its reporting, this was the first legisla-
tive session in recent years which did not see radical changes enacted 
in regard to state agency structure. However, there were a num-
ber of significant new agencies created and administrative changes 
worthy of notation. 
A new board of registration was established to regulate the licensing 
of dispensing opticians.1 The board, which becomes the nineteenth 
board under the Division of Registration, will be composed of five 
members appointed by the Governor and Council. Four of the mem-
bers must have been practicing dispensing opticians for at least ten 
years prior to the enactment of the legislation. 
By 1955 legislation a criminal information bureau has been estab-
lished in the Department of Public Safety.2 The new bureau will 
work with local police departments on common problems and will it-
self conduct various types of criminal investigational activities. The 
new bureau is discussed at greater length in Section 14.20 supra. 
The five-year experiment with an autonomous outdoor advertising 
3 See 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §24.3. 
§18.1. 1 Senate No. 763 (1954); 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §19.1. 
§18.2. 1 Acts of 1955, c. 688. 
2 Id., c. 761. 
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authority has ended with 1955 legislation.3 The agency is transferred 
back to the Department of Public Works and again becomes a func-
tional division of that department as it was before 1947. In that year 
it was made an independent agency under the Governor and Council 
with the hope that the autonomy would aid in carrying out its given 
tasks in the control of outdoor advertising, mostly highway billboards, 
throughout the state. It was found, however, in loss of the services of 
the Department's Highway Division skilled workers, such as engineers 
and surveyors, that the administrative difficulties of separateness were 
greater than the new freedom was worth. 
By Chapter 677 of the Acts of 1955 the duties aQd functions of the 
Commissioner and Associate Commissioners in the Department of Pub-
lic Works were redefined. The associate commissionerships were spe-
cifically made full-time positions with each required to place a bond 
with the state Treasurer for faithful performance of duties. The legis-
lation also sets up a rational scheme for distribution of duties be-
tween the three top officials of the Department. Formerly, a majority 
vote of the three was required by law for "every official act of depart-
ment." Also, the Commissioner was not authorized to delegate any of 
his own duties to his subordinates. Under the new act, executive and 
administrative authority is vested in the Commissioner with the 
majority-vote rule applying only to "all contracts made by the de-
partment." The Commissioner is authorized to assign such duties to 
the Associate Commissioners as he designates and he may delegate to 
them to exercise in his name any power or duty assigned to the Com-
missioner by law. The new legislation should aid the Department con-
siderably in establishing a more effective administrative organization. 
§18.3. Separation of powers: Duties of the Attorney General in 
regard to public charities. In one of the best-written decisions of the 
year, Ames v. Attorney General,1 the Court through Chief Justice Qua 
refused to review the action of the Attorney General in denying the 
petitioners' request to institute court action for a declaratory decree 
concerning the actions of the trustees of a public charitable trust. Put 
more precisely, the petitioners requested the Supreme Judicial Court 
to order the Attorney General to give them a hearing on the issue of 
whether or not the petitioners had presented a "question fit for judi-
cial inquiry." They asserted that this was the only question which 
should be decided at that point by the Attorney General, and if 
such a question was presented, the latter must then bring the appro-
priate action in court. The petitioners admitted that they had had a 
conference with the Attorney General and that he had determined no 
breach of trust had been made by the trustees. The petitioners 
claimed that the Attorney General cannot make such a determination 
3 Id., c. 584. 
§18.3. 1332 Mass. 246,1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. Ill, 124 N.E.2d 511. 
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where disputed issues of fact are involved.2 The petitioners claimed 
further that he had made errors of law in concluding there was no 
breach of trust in the case. The petitioners thus concluded that the 
decision of the Attorney General was an abuse of discretion. 
Chief Justice Qua sustained a demurrer to the petition holding that 
the decision of the Attorney General is a matter of "purely executive 
decision which is not reviewable in a court of justice." 3 The Court 
was quite aware of the fact that the petitioners were requesting a hear-
ing before the Attorney General rather than a complete reversal of 
his decision on the merits. Chief Justice Qua referred to this as a 
"flank attack." He asserted that the petitioners admitted that the At-
torney General had exercised his discretion, though, they claimed, er-
roneously. Justice Qua replied: 
We are not convinced that the petitioners, who have no interest 
other than that of the general public, have any legal right to de-
mand a decision of the court in advance before action is brought, 
and when action may never be brought, in a matter ultimately 
resting in the executive discretion of the Attorney General, and 
when the court in the last analysis can only advise and cannot 
command. See Denby v. Berry, 263 U.S. 29, 36. We are ap-
palled at "the prospect that the multitude of executive and ad-
ministrative decisions which must be made daily are subject to at-
tack in court by self appointed members of the public without 
private interest, who may proceed to catechize the officer con-
cerned as to what views of the law he had entertained, what argu-
ments he had listened to and by which ones he had been influ-
enced. It seems to us that a practice of this kind would constitute 
an intolerable interference by the judiciary in the executive de-
partment of the government and would be in violation of art. 30 
of the Declaration of Rights. Stretch v. Timilty, 309 Mass. 267, 
and cases cited. Attorney General v. Trustees of Boston Elevated 
Railway, 319 Mass. 642, 656-657. We have been unable to dis-
cover any principle by which the case now before us can be differ-
entiated from a great number of cases that might be instituted 
from all sorts of motives. Not only would charitable trusts be 
exposed to attack from all sides, the prevention of which is one 
of the reasons for leaving the matter of bringing suit in the sole 
discretion of one officer, but, for aught we can see, other decisions 
in the administrative field having nothing to do with trusts would 
be laid open to similar assault.4 
The Court held that this matter is similar to many others in the area of 
administrative discretion, such as the decision of Attorneys General or 
2 Petitioner's Brief, p. 77. 
s 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 114, 124 N.E.2d at 513. 
41955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 117. 124 N.E.2d at 515. 
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District Attorneys not to prosecute in a criminal matter,5 or to bring 
other civil actions.6 The state's newly enacted Administrative Pro-
cedure Act also excludes matters such as this from coverage under the 
act.7 The petitioners were able to cite the policy of previous Massa-
chusetts Attorneys General of bringing these matters to court as long as 
there was a disputed issue of fact, but they admitted very little de-
cisional authority for this viewpoint. 
The Court found that the petitioners here had no private standing to 
attack the actions of the trustees of the charity, though they did have 
some interest. The trust concerned action of the President and Fel-
lows of Harvard College as trustees of the Arnold Arboretum. All but 
two of the petitioners were members of the visiting committee ap-
pointed by the Harvard Board of Overseers. The Court asserted 
that the petitioners had no standing "different from that of other 
members of the public." It would seem, therefore, that merely "in-
terested persons" cannot obtain a judicial hearing on matters in this 
area. 
The policy of administrative discretion in cases of this type has 
been subjected to some criticism.s It has been suggested that some 
independent private right to take action where a person has some 
determinable interest is advisable. A procedure for private persons 
to initiate actions has been in use in Britain for some years in criminal 
matters.\} 
Of course, the petitioners' argument for restricting the Attorney 
General's function to determining whether a "justiciable question" is 
presented can still be made to the legislature. lO 
§18.4. State personnel system. The extensive revision of the state 
government personnel system enacted in 1954 as a result of the recom-
mendations of the state's "Baby Hoover Commission" were examined 
in the 1954 SURVEy.1 By Chapter 643 of the Acts of 1955 further com-
prehensive changes recommended by that Commission were adopted. 
The 1955 changes concern mainly the establishment of a more effective 
5 Newman v. United States, 238 U.S. 537, 35 Sup. Ct. C81, 59 L. Ed. 1446 (1915); 
Brierley v. Walsh, 299 Mass. 292, 12 N.E.2d 827 (1938); Commonwealth v. Tuck, 20 
Pick. 356 (Mass. 1838); Kirkpatrick v. Retail Merchants Assn. of Tulsa, 140 Okla. 
118, 282 Pac. 668 (1929). 
6 State v. jones, 252 Ala. 479, 41 So.2d 280 (1947); Boyle v. Ryan, 100 Cal. 265, 34 
Pac. 707 (1893); Lewright v. Bell, 94 Tex. 556, 63 S.W. 623 (1901). 
7 G.L., c. 30A, §l(l)(a). 
8 See Comment, Private Prosecution: A Remedy for District Attorney's Unwar-
ranted Inaction, 65 Yale L.j. 209 (1955). 
\} jackson, The Machinery of Criminal Justice in England 108-110 (1953); Atkinson, 
The Department of the Director of Private Prosecutions, 22 Can. B. Rev. 413 (1944). 
10 Space limitations preclude the discussion here of difficulties of legislative ac-
tion in this area. Some of the problems involved, even if legislation were adopted, 
may emerge from a reading of the recent Pendergast v. Board of Appeals of Barn-
stable, 331 Mass. 555, 120 N.E.2d 916 (1954); see 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.25. 
See also §13.2 supra. 
§18.4. 1 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §19.7. 
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administration of the personnel system by concentrating greater re-
sponsibility in the Division of Personnel and Standardization. The 
legislation is intended to produce greater uniformity in the manner of 
appointing, promoting, and classifying state employees for salary pur-
poses. 
Under the previous law, recommendations for step increases in sal-
ary originated with the heads of the various agencies. Hereafter, all 
step increases will originate in the centralized agency, the Division of 
Personnel and Standardization, on an automatic basis as the time in 
grade for the step increase is reached with the individual employee. 
Under the new legislation supervisory power and rule-making au-
thority in regard to hours of work, tours of duty, and overtime are 
transferred from the Commission on Administration and Finance to the 
Division of Personnel and Standardization. Section 10 of the new legis-
lation provides for more uniform classification and specification for 
all state personnel by requiring that classes and grades for positions 
under the authority of the Civil Service Commission be made "consist-
ent, so far as practicable," with specifications for appointive positions. 
as defined by the Division of Personnel and Standardization under 
G.L., c. 30, §45. 
Changes were also enacted in regard to teachers and supervisors in 
the schools and colleges, placing them on a more equitable basis in 
regard to other -state employees, allowing them to retain credit for 
years of service for salary purposes when they are transferred to posi-
tions requiring twelve months service instead of nine. 
Extensive changes were made in regard to personnel in the Com-
monwealth's hospitals and penal institutions, giving permanent em-
ployees with over six months of service the same job protection in 
relation to such things as discharge, removal, transfer, or lowering in 
rank or salary except for reasons of "just cause" as under the Civil 
Service laws. 
An important change was made in the method of appointing and 
promoting employees within the Civil Service. Previously, if an em-
ployee whose name appeared lower than others on the Civil Service 
list was appointed or promoted, the officer was required to give writ-
ten reasons for not appointing those higher on the list. Now, the offi-
cer need only give his reason for appointing or promoting the em-
ployee he did recommend for the position. This method tends to 
make for a more positive approach to appointment and promotion 
and eliminates the requirement of expressing detrimental matter in 
regard to those passed over. 
B. M UNICIP AL GOVERNMENT 
In the average year there are many developments in this field which 
are of primary interest to lawyers representing municipalities, with a 
6
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more limited number of developments of interest to lawyers in gen-
eral practice and to the public generally. The 1955 SURVEY year 
followed this same pattern. No attempt is made herein to cover the 
many decisions or new statutes on highly specialized subjects of limited 
interest. The one phase of municipal law which seems to have had 
the greatest impact on the general public - to judge in part from the 
number of court decisions produced - is that of zoning. There is a 
continuing contest between the individual and the municipality over 
municipal attempts to control or limit the private individual in the 
uses which he may make of his property. Certain aspects of the sub-
ject will be discussed here, while others will be treated elsewhere in 
the SURVEY. For an examination of certain substantive law phases of 
the zoning cases, see Section 1.2 supra; for a discussion of some very 
significant cases on the procedures for judicial review of decisions of 
local zoning boards of appeals, see Section 13.2 supra. 
§18.5. Procedural requirements for enactment of zoning by-laws. 
It is a common practice for municipal legislative authorities to enact 
by-laws or ordinances which differ in some respects from the enactment 
or amendment covered by the original request or by the notice of the 
public hearing required to be held thereon. There is often a question 
whether a change subsequent to the required public hearing means 
that there must be another public hearing. The case of Morgan v. 
Banasl makes it clear that a change along the way as the result of which 
only part of the tract originally described is rezoned does not require 
a new public hearing. This confirms what had been commonly as-
sumed to be the law on this subject, but this precise point had not 
been decided in several previous decisions on similar or related ques-
tions.2 
The Morgan case held that the ~act that due to an intervening elec-
tion there had been changes in the members of the municipal legisla-
tive body between the date of the public hearing held by that body and 
the subsequent date on which it voted on the zoning amendment did 
not affect the validity of the amendment nor did it require a new 
hearing. 
It is common practice for the owner of property who seeks an 
amendment of the zoning ordinances or by-laws affecting his property 
to inform the municipal legislative authorities of the use which he pro-
poses to make of his property if the amendment which he seeks is 
adopted. Would the legality of such an amendment be affected if the 
applicant in fact intentionally misrepresented his intended use and 
thereby deceived the authorities? The Morgan case holds that this 
would not affect the validity of the amendment, saying that "courts 
cannot, for the purpose of determining the validity of legislation, re-
§18.5. l331 Mass. 694, 122 N.E.2d 369 (1954). 
2 Lundy v. Wayland, 328 Mass. 581, 105 N.E.2d 378 (1952); Fish v. Canton, 322 
Mass. 219, 77 N.E.2d 231 (1948); Burlington v. Dunn, 318 Mass. 216, 61 N.E.2d 542 
(1945). 
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ceive evidence of the inducements and motives of the legislators in 
enacting it." 3 
§18.6. Powers, duties, and jurisdiction of zoning board of appeals. 
The first level at which a property owner may become involved with 
the administrative procedures relating to the application of zoning 
laws is in the making of an application to the enforcing authority, 
usually the building inspector, for a building permit or for a permit 
to make a particular use of land. If the proposed building or use 
complies with the existing building code and zoning laws, he is enti-
tled as of right to a permit for such building or use. In the case of 
Fellsway Realty Corp. v. Building Commissioner of Medford,1 the 
Court said that "the right to build would be utterly lacking in sub-
stance if its exercise could be prevented by the arbitrary and capricious 
refusal of a permit, or if the granting or denial of the permit rested in 
the discretion of some official or board." 2 In this case the building 
commissioner refrained from taking any action on the application for 
the building permit. Nevertheless, under the applicable statute,3 the 
applicant was as much entitled to appeal to the board of appeals as if 
the official had expressly denied his application. 
For many years prior to 1955 the zoning statutes4 provided that "an 
appeal to the board of appeals . . . may be taken by any person ag-
grieved by reason of his inability to obtain a permit from any adminis-
trative official ... " In addition, the same statutes provided that the 
local zoning ordinances and by-laws "may provide that ... appeals 
may be taken to the board of appeals by any officer or board of the 
city or town, or by any person aggrieved by any order or decision of 
the inspector of buildings or other administrative official in violation 
of ... " the zoning statutes or local zoning ordinances or by-laws. 
By 1955 legislation5 this statute was amended to provide that "an ap-
peal to the board of appeals . . . may be taken . . ." in such cases. 
Therefore, it would seem that under the present law, regardless of 
whether or not the local zoning' ordinance or by-law so provides, not 
only the applicant but also other aggrieved persons or officers or 
boards may appeal from the alleged wrongful action of the building 
inspector to the board of appeals. The new statute now provides that 
"a zoning ordinance or by-law may prescribe a reasonable time within 
which appeals under this section may be taken." Perhaps very few 
municipalities h!lve bothered to amend their zoning ordinances or 
by-laws to prescribe such time limit, with the result that some litiga-
tion is sure to arise on the question of the time for taking such ap-
peals. A more difficult question which may arise, particularly as to 
8 Morgan v. Banas, 331 Mass. 694, 698, 122 N.E.2d 369, 371 (1954). 
§18.6. 1332 Mass. 471, 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 371, 125 N.E.2d 791. 
21955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 371, 125 N.E.2d at 792. 
3 G.L., c. 40A, §13. 
4 G.L., c. 40A, §13, and, prior thereto, G.L., c. 40, §30(5). 
5 Acts of 1955, c. 325. 
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appeals by anyone coming within the meaning of the words "any 
person aggrieved," 6 and other than the applicant himself, will be 
whether the appealing party may be bound by the passage of any lim-
ited time if no procedure is set up for some kind of recording or 
publication of the action of the building inspector, from which act of 
recording or publication the limited period may run. Certainly such 
limited time should not start to run only when "a person aggrieved" 
actually learns of the administrative action from which he has the right 
to appeal. In the comparable statute providing appeals by such per-
sons from action by the board of appeals7 the time limit of fifteen 
days runs from the time of the recording of the board's decision with 
the city or town clerk, which recording is required by law.s There is 
no comparable requirement as to the action of building inspectors in 
granting building permits, nor is there any public hearing or notice or 
publication in connection with, or as a condition precedent to, the 
action of the building inspector. 
§18.7. Vote required for action by board of appeals. The very 
first statute in Massachusetts to permit variances from the provlSlons 
of zoning ordinances or by-laws was enacted in 1924,1 and it provided 
that "no such variance shall be authorized except by the unanimous 
decision of the entire membership of the board ... " This require-
ment for a unanimous vote continued in successor statutes,2 the last 
provision thereon prior to 1955 being that "the concurring vote of all 
the members of a board of appeals shall be necessary to reverse any 
order or decision of any administrative official under this chapter, or 
to decide in favor of the applicant on any matter upon which it is 
required to pass under any zoning ordinance or by-law, or to effect 
any variance in the application of any such ordinance or by-law." 
This requirement of a unanimous vote often worked hardships by rea-
son of a single dissenting vote against otherwise unanimous action of a 
board of appeals on an apparently deserving application. Many efforts 
have been made through the years to reduce the number of votes re-
quired to constitute favorable action by such boards. This was finally 
accomplished by the enactment of an amendment approved May 6, 
1955,3 to the following effect: 
The concurring vote of all the members of a board of appeals 
consisting of not more than four members, and the concurring 
6 This, of course, is the general problem of standing to seek review of administra-
tive action. The term "person aggrieved" is common statutory language in this 
regard. See Federal Administrative Procedure Act §IO(a), 5 U.S.C. §IOII(a) (1946); 
Massachusetts Administrative Procedure Act, G.L., c. 30A, §I4; and see Davis, Ad-
ministrative Law §202 (1951). 
7 G.L., c. 40A, §21. 
8 Ibid. 
§18.7. 1 G.L., c. 40, §27A, as enacted by Acts of 1938, c. 133. 
2 G.L., c. 40, §29, G.L., c. 40A, §19. 
3 Acts of 1955, c. 349, amending G.L., c. 40A, §19. 
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vote of all except one member of a board consisting of more than 
four members, shall be necessary to reverse any order or decision 
of any administrative official under this chapter, or to decide in 
favor of the applicant on any matter upon which it is required to 
pass under any zoning ordinance or by-law, or to effect any vari-
ance in the application of any such ordinance or by-law. 
§18.8. Board of appeals: Power to allow special uses. The 1946 
case of Smith v. Board of Appeals of Fall River1 cast a long and dark 
shadow on the validity of provisions of local zoning ordinances or by-
laws purporting to authorize boards of appeals discretion to allow 
uses other than those expressly permitted in particular districts. In 
that case the Court struck down an ordinance which purported to 
authorize the board of appeals to permit alteration and use as a resi-
dence for not more than a specified number of families of any build-
ing in any district, with certain limitations as to changes in cubic 
content and as to outside enlargements. The Court said of the or-
dinance: 
It opened the door to discrimination not based upon valid dif-
ference. It purported to delegate to the board ·of appeals power 
to bring about situations where the regulations and restrictions 
would not be "uniform for each class or kind of buildings, struc-
tures or land, and for each class or kind of use, throughout each 
district" ... It attempted to override careful limitation upon 
the power to grant variances laid down by said section 30 [of G.L., 
c. 40] ... It attempted to delegate to the board of appeals, apart 
from its power to authorize variances, a new power to alter the 
characteristics of zoning districts, a power conferred by said sec-
tion 25 [of G.L., c. 40] only upon the legislative body of the 
city ... and it attempted to do this without furnishing any prin-
ciples or rules by which the board should be guided, leaving the 
board unlimited authority to indulge in "spot zoning" at its dis-
cretion or whim ... 2 
During the 1955 SURVEY year, on facts which are in some respects 
difficult to distinguish from those of the Smith case, the Court reached 
an opposite conclusion in the case of Burnham v. Board of Appeals of 
Gloucester.S The Gloucester ordinance contained a provision permit-
ting the board of appeals to permit the building of motels in single 
residence districts, provided certain building and land requirements 
were met, and provided that "no permit shall be granted . . . without 
considering the effects upon the neighborhood and the City at large." 
The Court used the following language in an attempt to distin-
guish the Gloucester case of 1955 from the Fall River case of 1946: 
§18.8. 1319 Mass. 341, 65 N.E.2d 547 (1946). 
2319 Mass. at 344, 65 N.E.2d at 549. 
81955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 881. 128 N.E.2d 772. 
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The ordinance in that case [Smith v. Board of Appeals of Fall 
River] was struck down as being an evasion of the strict require-
ments for variances and as giving to the board of appeals what 
was in effect a roving commission to engage in spot zoning. But 
we are of opinion that that case is not controlling. The amend-
ment under consideration specifically authorizes motels to be con-
structed and operated in any district provided permission to do so 
is obtained from the board. Therefore the board by granting a 
permit is not engaged in rezoning an area to permit an excluded 
use. Nor is it engaged in varying the terms of the ordinance.4 
The Gloucester case does not expressly overrule the Fall River 
case, but the Court's effort to distinguish between the apparently sim-
ilar facts in the two cases is not uncommonly part of a prelude, some-
times of long duration, to the express overruling of a case. But for 
the more recent Gloucester case, there might be considerable doubt as 
to the validity of the provisions of many local zoning ordinances and 
by-laws which give boards of appeals discretionary power to permit 
buildings and uses where they are otherwise forbidden. 
§18.9. School committee powers: Appointments, removals, and de-
motions. In the case of Povey v. School Committee of Medford,! the 
Court sustained a demurrer to a bill of complaint which seemed to be 
a petition for a declaratory judgment under C.L., c. 231A, although it 
also had some of the attributes of a taxpayers' bill under C.L., c. 40, 
§53. The bill of complaint alleged that, although the superintendent 
of schools recommended one person for appointment as principal, the 
school committee ignored the recommendation and instead appointed 
another person who was a brother-in-law of one of the committee mem-
bers, with a further allegation that a majority of the committee acted 
in bad faith. The Court in upholding the sustaining of the demurrer 
to the bill made the following points: (I) Taxpayers of a municipal-
ity cannot make themselves parties to the appointment of every officer 
or employee of the municipality and thus require the appointing of-
ficers to account for their acts to such taxpayers as may volunteer to 
bring suit. (2) The alleged bad faith of a majority of the school 
committee is no ground for relief. The Court cited the 1953 case 
of Kelley v. School Committee of Watertown 2 where it had said that 
"there is, however, no general rule that a court can sit in judgment on 
the motives of administrative officers, acting in purely administrative 
matters, and overturn action found to have been taken in bad faith." 
(3) The recommendation of the superintendent of schools is advisory 
only, and it is in no way binding upon the school committee, citing the 
leading case of Russell v. Gannon3 on the point. 
41955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 881, 128 N.E.2d at 775. 
§18.9. 11955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 815, 127 N.E.2d 925. 
2330 Mass. 150, III N.E.2d 749 (1953). 
3281 Mass. 398, 183 N.E. 736 (1933). 
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With the recent trend for the construction of new and in many cases 
consolidated schools, with the resulting abandonment or closing down 
of many older schools, school committees have been vexed with the 
problem of what to do about the principals of the closed schools. 
School principals are protected by statute4 against demotion except 
after notice and an opportunity for a hearing, and for certain causes 
stated in the statute, which makes no mention of the closing of schools. 
What maya school committee do with a principal when it has more 
principals than it has schools, or when it closes a school and no longer 
needs the principal in that position? This problem was involved in 
the case of Jantzen v. School Committee of Chelmsford.5 The Chelms-
ford school committee voted to close two old schools as the result of 
opening one new school. They voted to assign the principal of one of 
the closed schools to a teaching assignment at the new school, with no 
reduction in pay. They did this without giving the principal any no-
tice or hearing. The principal sought a writ of mandamus to compel 
the school committee to grant her a hearing as required by the statute, 
and to recognize her as the principal of the new school. The Supreme 
Judicial Court denied her relief in language which reflects the neces-
sity for the application of practical common sense and reasonableness 
to a situation which apparently had not been contemplated by the 
statute. The Court said: 
She [petitioner] may have had a technical right to notice and a 
hearing but she had no right to be appointed principal of the new 
school. That was not the position she had previously held. . . . 
If the petitioner had had a hearing it would not have been upon 
the question whether she should be appointed to the new school 
or to any other particular school. . . . The school committee un-
questionably had power to close the Princeton Street School. 
[Citations omitted.] The court cannot now order the school com-
mittee to install the petitioner as principal of some other school, 
even if one is available - a fact which .does not appear. 
The court will not issue its writ to require a hearing which it 
can see must be futile.6 
§18.10. Liability for highway defects. The liability of a munici-
pality for ordinary highway defects is of statutory origin, and the stat-
ute l requires certain notices as conditions precedent to recovery. 
However, the case of Flynn v. Hurley2 is one of those rare reminders 
that there can be under some circumstances a municipal liability at 
common law for defective highways. Such liability may arise, for ex-
4 C.L., c. 71, §42A. 
6332 Mass. 175, 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 35, 124 N.E.2d 534. 
61955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 37, 124 N.E.2d at 536. 
§18.1O. 1 C.L., c. 84. 
2332 Mass. 182, 124 N.E.2d 810 (1955). 
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ample, by reason of negligence in making or filling excavations within 
highways for sewer or water installations, with reference to which in-
stallations municipalities do not enjoy immunity from liability for 
negligence, or it may arise in cases where a municipality owning or 
operating a gas or electric plant may be liable for negligence in con-
nection therewith under our statutes.3 Furthermore, in such special 
cases, insofar as the injury involves a highway defect, the failure to 
give the statutory notice of defect4 does not bar recovery.5 
Although the statute imposing liability upon municipalities for de-
fects in "ways" does not attempt to define what is meant by the word 
"way," 6 a series of decisions7 going back at least to 1834 has operated 
to limit the liability principally to cases where the defects are in the 
traveled portion of the way, with no liability usually for conditions 
which might be defects but which are located outside of the traveled 
portion of the way although within the outside limits of the entire 
highway. However, the case of Brennan v. Cambridge8 may be an in-
dication that the Court will not apply this limitation of liability as 
strictly as it has done in the past. In this case the plaintiff was injured 
by a fall caused by catching her foot on a tree root about six inches 
high, running parallel to a curb, but between the edge of the sidewalk 
and the curb. The plaintiff was crossing the street at this location 
which is not a crosswalk. 
Perhaps this case does not detract from the weight to be given to ear-
lier precedents, since the Court says: "We think it cannot be said that 
the place of the accident was 'not a part of the traveled path.' So far as 
appears a pedestrian was entitled to use it for travel, as the plaintiff 
did." 9_ On the premise that the root may have been located in the 
"traveled path" the decision can be reconciled with the earlier deci-
sions; otherwise it cannot. If the test of whether this was a part of the 
"traveled path" is whether "a pedestrian was entitled to use it for 
travel," we may be opening the door wide for the reason that a pedes-
trian probably is entitled to use any part of the area within the limits 
of a way for travel, whether or not such part be within the construded 
or usually traveled portion of the way.10 The Court refers to one of 
the earlier precedents to the contrary,n but does not attempt to distin-
guish the two cases other than by the language quoted above. 
3 G.L., c. 164, §§64, 74. 
4 G.L., c. 84, §18. 
5 Green v. West Springfield, 323 Mass. 335,81 N.E.2d 819 (1948). 
6 G.L., c. 84, §15. 
7 Howard v. North Bridgewater, 16 Pick. 189 (Mass. 1834); Kellogg v. Northamp-
ton, 4 Gray 65 (Mass. 1855) (but see Kellogg v. Northampton, 8 Gray 504 (Mass. 
1857»; Weare v. Fitchburg, 110 Mass. 334 (1872); Dupuis v. Billerica, 260 Mass. 210, 
157 N.E. 339 (1927); Miles v. Commonwealth, 288 Mass. 243, 192 N.E. 488 (1934). 
But see Raymond v. Lowell, 6 Cush. 524, 530 (Mass. 1850). 
8332 Mass. 613, 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 571, 127 N.E.2d 181. 
91955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 571, 127 N.E.2d at 183. 
10 Raymond v. Lowell, 6 Cush. 524, 530 (Mass. 1850). 
11 Kellogg v. Northampton, 4 Gray 65 (Mass. 1855). 
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§18.11. Liability for damages caused by sewers and drains. The 
rule that a municipality is not responsible for damages caused to in-
dividuals through any defect or inadequacy in the plan of its system 
of sewers, but is responsible for damages which accrue to individuals 
through negligence in the construction, maintenance, or operation of 
its system of sewers, a rule which has been stated and applied in many 
decisions,1 was again stated in the 1955 decision of The Lobster Pot of 
Lowell, Inc. v. City of Lowell.2 The rule is probably well understood 
and followed by lawyers generally. However, the same cannot be 
said for the law applicable to the liability, if any, of municipalities for 
damages caused by waters overflowing from street storm or surface wa-
ter drains and basins. All too often, no effort is made to distinguish 
between damages caused by the negligent operation or maintenance 
of sewers on the one hand and the alleged negligent operation or 
maintenance of street storm or surface water drains on the other. As 
to the latter there may be no liability, while as to the former there may 
be. This is well illustrated in the case of Fulton v. Town of Belmont,S 
also decided during the 1955 SURVEY year, where the Court denied re-
lief in a case involving street drains, and used the following language: 
Here the town built in the limits of a street two catch basins in-
terconnected but not tied in with a storm drain or sewer. It had 
a right to do this and it was not required to dispose of surface wa-
ter if any was collected. If the town had allowed this surface wa-
ter to seep and percolate out of the catch basins, thereby flooding 
abutting land, no action would lie . . . because the building of 
the catch basins would be designed to keep streets in repair and 
safe for trave1.4 
If these catch basins were installed for these reasons, adjoining 
owners could erect structures on their lands up to the line of the 
highway to prevent surface water from flowing onto their land.1S 
§18.12. Appropriations. General Laws, c. 40, §5 contains a long 
list of purposes for which municipalities may make appropriations. 
The following purposes were added in 1955, although many munici-
palities have been appropriating funds for such purposes for many 
years: 
(1) Construction, maintenance, and operation of incinerators.1 
§18.11. 1 See, for example. Anglim v. Brockton. 278 Mass. 90, 179 N.E. 289 (1932); 
Pevear v. Lynn. 249 Mass. 486. 144 N.E. 379 (1924). 
21955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 769,127 N.E.2d 659. The decision is examined in §3.8 supra. 
s1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 679. 127 N.E.2d 569. 
41955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 683. 127 N.E.2d at 571. 
IS See Buerkel v. Boston. 286 Mass. 412. 190 N.E. 788 (1934); Holleran v. Boston. 
176 Mass. 75.57 N.E. 220 (1900); Bates v. Westborough. 151 Mass. 174.23 N.E. 1070 
(1890). 
§18.12. 1 Acts of 1955, c. 85. 
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(2) Construction, maintenance, and operation of outdoor artificial 
ice-skating rinks.2 
The same new statutes also amend G.L., c. 44, §7, listing the pur-
poses for which municipalities may borrow money. 
§18.13. "Lame duck" salary increases. Heretofore G.L., c. 44, §33A 
provided that no ordinance providing for an increase in municipal 
salaries or wages should be enacted unless it was to be operative for 
more than three months during the financial year in which it was 
passed. This applied to both election and non-election years. By the 
Acts of 1955, c. 358, this has been changed as to the non-election years 
only to permit ordinances to be passed in December of such years in-
creasing municipal salaries or wages as of the next January 1st. The 
prohibition still stands as to election years. 
§18.14. Betterment assessments for water pipes. By virtue of the 
Acts of 1955, c. 332, our General Laws now contain express authority 
for municipalities accepting such legislation to levy betterment assess-
ment for water pipes laid in public and private ways. The method of 
assessment is very much like that applicable to sewers under G.L., c. 83. 
§18.15. Traffic control on private ways and private parking areas. 
Heretofore municipalities have been handicapped by the lack of ex-
press authority to regulate the parking or movement of vehicles on 
private ways, the express authority being limited to that found in G.L., 
c. 40, §21(14), relating to ways furnishing means of access for fire ap-
paratus to tenement houses or apartment houses. There was no ex-
press authority over private parking areas, except such as might result 
from the licensing powers under G.L., c. 148, §56. By Acts of 1955, 
c. 135, it is now provided that upon written application and consent of 
the owner or person in control of a private way or parking area a mu-
nicipality may "make special regulations as to the speed of motor 
vehicles and as to the use of said vehicles upon the particular private 
way or parking area." Such special regulations are effective for not 
more than one year, but they may be extended for additional periods 
of one year each upon new written application. 
§18.16. Building codes: State and local powers. In a particularly 
significant piece of legislation, Acts of 1955, c. 617, the General Court 
amended G.L., c. 143, §3J in such a manner that a local building in-
spector is now required to issue a building permit to an applicant 
whose plans and specifications do not comply with the local building 
code, provided they do comply with the alternative requirements speci-
fied in rules and regulations made by the Board of Standards in the 
Massachusetts Department of Public Safety, which board is required to 
file a copy of such rules and regulations with the state Secretary, where-
upon they shall have the force of law. Formerly the law provided that 
"an inspector of buildings may issue a permit or certificate for such 
construction ... if said plans and specifications comply with the al-
2 Id., Co 716. 
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ternatives set forth in the regulations . . . and he is of the opinion 
that said alternatives provide adequate performance for the purposes 
for which their use is intended ... and they are reasonable, sound 
and accurate and would not tend or be injurious or detrimental to the 
character of the neighborhood or to other property therein." By con-
trast, the law as amended now provides that "no permit or certificate 
shall be refused or denied on the grounds that such plans and specifica-
tions fail to comply with the provisions of any ordinance, by-law, rule 
or regulation, or any special law applicable to any particular city or 
town ... if said plans and specifications comply with the alternatives 
... in the regulations ... [of the Board of Standards]." This 
may result in local building codes being superseded to a great extent 
by the rules and regulations of the Massachusetts Board of Standards. 
§I8.17. Regional planning boards. By the Acts of 1955, c. 374, 
cities and towns are now authorized to establish regional or metropoli-
tan planning boards to consider planning problems on an area-wide 
basis. Under the enabling act, municipalities may organize regional 
or metropolitan planning districts coterminous with the area of the 
towns which compose the district. The district organizations cannot 
be formed without the approval of the State Planning Board in the De-
partment of Commerce on a determination "that such group of cities 
and towns will constitute an effective region for planning purposes." 
In each district so formed there will be a district Planning Commis-
sion composed of one member from each local planning board. The 
Commission will consider problems of a regional nature and prepare 
comprehensive plans for the district and "make recommendations for 
the physical, social and economic improvement of the district." The 
plans and recommendation will be advisory only and will have no 
force unless adopted in the normal course by the municipal planning 
boards. 
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